Too much, too little, too late? : Reflections on law and ethics in the EU's foreign policy by Klabbers, Johannes Antonius Maria
  
This is a draft chapter. The final version is available in Research Handbook on the 
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy edited by Steven Blockmans & Panos 
Koutrakos, published in 2018, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781785364082 
 
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of 
the publisher, and is for private use only. 
  
  







When asked to reflect on whether there might be too much law in the foreign 
policies of the European Union (CFSP/CSDP), several hypotheses can possibly be 
developed, and several preliminary questions need to be asked.2 Whenever there 
is talk of ‘too much’, or ‘too little’ or, for that matter, ‘just enough’, the obvious 
follow-up question should be: too much, or too little, for what purpose exactly? 
From which perspective? From whose point of view? The claim that there might 
be too much law presupposes that law serves a particular purpose, which would 
seemingly be better served if there were a little less law; the claim that there 
might be too little law, conversely, suggests that for that particular purpose, 
there should perhaps be more law, not less. And all this, it should be noted, 
leaves unmentioned the question whether the law concerned (of which there is 
too much, or too little) is actually any good, either instrumentally (in that it helps 
serve the purpose it is supposed to serve) or normatively (in that it is the sort of 
law we might also welcome on moral grounds). 
In the specific context of the EU, several additional questions need to be asked. Is 
the amount of law just right for internal purposes, or should the focus rest on ex-
ternal issues? In the former case, one might think of the law serving the purpose 
of balancing the positions of the member states and the EU’s institutions in some 
way or another: the right amount of law then is the amount that keeps the cho-
sen balance, well, in balance, so to speak. 
                                               
1 Jan Klabbers is Academy Professor (Martti Ahtisaari Chair) at the University of Helsinki, and 
Visiting Research Professor at Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam. 
2 My approach differs from De Witte’s a decade ago, addressing the question whether there 
would be too much constitutional law. It is fair to say my approach situates itself on a different 
level of abstraction. See Bruno de Witte, ‘Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s 
Foreign Relations?’, in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law (Ox-
ford: Hart, 2008), 3-15. 
  
What is just the right amount of law for internal purposes, however, may be way 
too much law to allow for swift and decisive action externally. Thus, commenta-
tors might complain about the amount of red tape required to get any action un-
der way: surely, a foreign policy incident requiring quick action by the EU might 
not be best served by an overdose of law, so the argument could go. 
Even this does not exhaust the possibilities though: while the EU might want 
swift action on some level, the world at large might be better off if the EU is 
forced, through legal inhibitors, to act slowly: one would not want to add another 
hotheaded entity to the circus of international politics, populated as it is these 
days by macho men with short fuses and long twitter accounts. A cool head 
might be preferable, and a forced waiting period, imposed by law, might be just 
the way to force heads to cool off.3 
And then there is the question of alternatives. Surely, consultation of member 
states will be required, whether the obligation to consult is legal in nature or 
whether it is considered to be part of some extra-legal gentlemen’s agreement, or 
whether considered to be politically prudent, or considered to contribute to an 
action’s legitimacy. In case the obligation is legal in nature one can possibly com-
plain about there being too much law, but not in the other cases – if there is no 
law involved, then there cannot be too much law, but that does not automatically 
entail the absence of rules generaliter. 
In what follows, I will discuss two incidents where, one might say, the amount of 
law is somehow at issue, mindful of the above-mentioned caveats. The first ad-
dresses the curious position of the staff of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; the second takes a closer look at the EU’s strained relationship 
with Ukraine. The point I aim to make is that sometimes it is not about too much 
law or too little law or just enough law; sometimes things are more about the 
mindset of the relevant actors than about any relevant rules. Important as rules 
are (legal or otherwise), they are, eventually, better seen as signposts than as ab-
solutes. They offer guidance and ought to be followed, but not blindly or at all 
                                               
3 The thought is of course far from original: it inspired article 12 of the League of Nations Cove-
nant, institutionalizing a cooling off period in case of belligerent sentiments.  
  
costs.4 Indeed, rules cannot even be followed slavishly, in that it takes practical 
wisdom to figure out whether some rule or other applies, and it takes practical 
wisdom to apply it wisely.5 Or, as the song goes, ‘It ain’t what you do, it’s the way 
that you do it’. The two incidents I aim to discuss form illustrations or anecdotal 
evidence (‘anecdata’) of that particular proposition, and will be followed by re-
flections on normative pluralism and a more philosophical elaboration on the 






2. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Ms H. 
 
Monty Python, if it would still exist, would have a field day with the following 
scenario. The EU operates a mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to spread the 
Rule of Law to this conflict-ridden and contested piece of Europe. The Rule of 
Law is a notoriously indeterminate concept, but is often thought to include as a 
minimum basic human rights protection, including such things as access to jus-
tice.6 And indeed, this is how the EU usually presents the Rule of Law to outsid-
ers: part of the Rule of Law, as most have agreed since Weber,7 involves the pos-
sibility for those who feel their rights have been infringed to seize a court. 
Enter the EU. After the United Nations had been exercising policing tasks in war-
torn Bosnia and Herzegovina for a number of years following the Yugoslav war, 
                                               
4 This generally builds on Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of 
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
5 On legal reasoning generally see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the 
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989). 
6 For an overview, see Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); see also Leonardo Morlino and Gianluigi Palombella (eds.), Rule of Law 
and Democracy: Inquiries into Internal and External Issues (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
7 While the term Rule of Law is often held to be coined by Dicey in the late 19th century, it is indel-
ibly associated with the great legal sociologist Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley CA: 
University of California Press, 1978, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds.) The important point 
to note is that for Weber, it mattered little what the law said, as long as there was law; the associ-
ation between the Rule of Law and quintessential liberal values came later and owes much to 
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 2001 [1944]). 
  
its role was taken over by the EU in 2002, by means of the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM), set up on the basis of a Council Joint Action which itself was 
based on Articles 28 and 43(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Union 
(TEU). All this was part of the much-heralded Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy (CFSP) – the EU’s bid to be taken seriously on the international scene as a 
power to be reckoned with, and one that prefers carrots over sticks, soft power 
over hard power. Among the values that this global power seeks to advance are 
democracy and free trade, but also the rule of law and fundamental human rights 
– article 21 TEU provides a list of the principles and values Europe holds dear 
and which shall guide its external activities. 
Indeed, the EUPM was considered part of a ‘broader rule of law approach’ in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, supporting local law enforcement agencies in the fight 
against organized crime and corruption. Missions such as EUPM are often 
planned to be of limited duration and demand a special kind of expertise, not al-
ways readily available within the organization responsible; as a result, often they 
work with people seconded by either their home governments or one of the EU 
institutions. 
So too in this case. Ms H was an Italian magistrate, seconded by the Italian gov-
ernment to work for a period of time for EUPM. As it happened, she was first sta-
tioned, since late 2008, as a Chief Legal Officer in Sarajevo but, from April 2010 
onwards, redeployed as Criminal Justice Adviser – Prosecutor in the regional 
EUPM office in Banja Luka. This she took to be a demotion, and she lodged a com-
plaint with the Italian authorities: since she was seconded, it would seem that 
she was working under Italian command. Italy duly suspended the decision to 
redeploy her, but the Head of Mission confirmed the decision, claiming a need for 
prosecutorial advice in the Banja Luka office. Thereupon, Ms H went to court 
both in Italy and in the EU, seizing the General Court and requesting annulment 
of the decision to redeploy her and an award of damages. The General Court de-
nied jurisdiction and held that the case was inadmissible8, but on appeal the ECJ 
                                               
8 Case T-271/10, H. v Council and Others, ECLI:EU:T:2014:702. 
  
disagreed, finding that the case was at least partly within the jurisdiction of the 
EU courts. It eventually referred the matter back to the General Court.9 
The case provides a lovely illustration of what public administration scholars re-
fer to as the problem of the many hands.10 EUPM consists partly of its own staff, 
recruited on a contractual basis in order to cater for specific needs. Mostly, how-
ever, it consists of staff that is seconded, either from the EU institutions, or (as in 
the case of Ms H) from member states. According to the relevant Council Deci-
sion 2001/264/EC, the seconding entity shall be the one answering possible 
claims, with the obvious result that the possibility might arise that different indi-
viduals working for the same entity (i.e., EUPM) could be subject to different 
rules and, what is more, subject to different regimes relating to judicial remedies. 
In extremis, it might even be the case that some would have access to the EU 
courts while their colleague at the opposite desk would be denied such access. 
This, clearly, would be undesirable, so the Council launched the simple argument 
that no one should have access to the EU courts. In the Council’s view, decisions 
such as the one to redeploy Ms H were operational CFSP decisions, and as such 
by definition excluded from the jurisdiction of the EU courts.11 
The General Court, active in first instance, did not quite agree, but did find that it 
lacked jurisdiction.12 Illustrating the wonderful artificiality that legal thinking 
may sometimes take on, the General Court argued that while the deployment de-
cision was taken by the Head of Mission, the fact that Ms H was seconded by Italy 
meant that the decision could be attributed to Italy, and that any relief would 
have to be sought before the Italian courts. This was different from the situation 
concerning those seconded by EU institutions. Hence, the General Court did not 
                                               
9 Case C-455/14 P, H. v Council and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:569. 
10 The classic treatment is by Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citi-
zenship in Complex Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 1998). Passing the buck is not un-
common with (other) international offices either: see Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative 
Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed Against the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development, advisory opinion, [2012) ICJ Reports 10. 
11 A more subtle variation of the argument holds that jurisdiction of the EU courts over the CFSP 
is limited in accordance with the intentions of the member states (Herren der Verträge, after all) 
and reflecting the special position of the CFSP in the EU’s legal order.  Expanding the jurisdiction 
of the Court requires legal justification, and not merely an integrationist or activist Court. For 
such an argument, see Panos Koutrakos, ‘Judicial Review in the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy’, (2017) 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, forthcoming. 
12 Case T-271/10, H. v Council and Others, ECLI:EU:T:2014:702 
  
(unlike the Council) deny jurisdiction altogether, but it did deny jurisdiction for 
those seconded by national authorities. 
Moreover, it made the point that none of this would result in the absence of a ju-
dicial remedy. After all, Ms H would have access to Italy’s courts! This would 
come with an uncomfortable drawback though – one that the General Court itself 
referred to, but failed to think through. Should Italy’s courts decide that the de-
ployment decision had been problematic, it was for Italy’s courts to decide what 
to do and ‘draw the appropriate conclusions with respect to the legality, or even 
the very existence, of the contested decisions.’13  The phrasing suggests that Italy 
might be in a position to invalidate decisions taken by the Head of Mission of 
EUPM – quite a far-reaching claim with the potential to fragment the manage-
ment of the mission and, more fundamentally, to break through the unity of EU 
law – hence, it was never likely that the ECJ would reach the same result. 
And it did not. Instead, it adopted a different frame. Contrary to the General 
Court, it did not view the contested decision as a matter relating to secondment, 
but rather as a decision relating to staff management, regardless of the question 
whether the staff was directly hired by EUPM or by whom it was seconded, and 
regardless of the fact that the mission generally fell within the ambit of the CFSP. 
As a result, the deployment decision fell within the regular scope of reviewable 
decisions, as enumerated in article 263 TFEU and (with respect to non-contrac-
tual liability) article 268 TFEU. The one thing the Court denied was that the Com-
mission was in any way involved, but it accepted jurisdiction with respect to the 
role of the Council, as it was the Council that was involved in the setting up and 
the running of EUPM. 
The Court’s solution also had the pleasant side-effect that, eventually, awkward 
questions about access to judicial remedies could be circumvented. After all, arti-
cle 47 of the EU’s very own Charter on Fundamental Rights guarantees a right to 
an effective remedy for everyone whose rights are supposed to be guaranteed by 
EU law, and Ms H was quick to rely on it.14 It would be ironic, to say the least, if 
such a right were denied to the people actively aiming to instill the same right in 
                                               
13 Ibid., para 53. 
14 As noted in ibid., para. 30. 
  
entities outside the EU, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.15 So, all’s well that ends 
well, eventually. Ms H received access to justice, and the Court of Justice could 
claim jurisdiction over a little part of CFSP activities, bringing this little part un-
der the umbrella of the EU rather than leaving it to the more inter-governmen-
tally oriented CFSP itself. That said though, it remains mystifying that people in 
positions of power can even think of exporting the rule of law while unblinkingly 
ignoring it at home – the very fact that Ms H had to go to court in order to get her 
day in court, and had to appeal, suggests that something is not quite right; the 
very fact of staff members of the same mission being treated differently depend-
ing on their original employment suggests that something is not quite right. The 
story suggests an over-reliance on rules perhaps, and an underappreciation of 
the old wisdom that one should not do unto others what one does not want done 
unto oneself. 
 
3. Ukraine and the Laws of Good Intentions 
 
If the case of Ms H posits several legal orders against each other, the story con-
cerning the EU’s involvement with Ukraine is more geared towards characteriza-
tion as a law versus ethics conflict, invoking two distinct normative orders but 
not two distinct legal orders.16 The broad outline goes as follows.17 
Since the fall of the Berlin wall, it has been a priority of the EU’s foreign policy to 
create closer ties with the now-independent parts of the former Soviet Union, as 
well as the latter’s satellite states. And the policy has met with great success, at 
                                               
15 While the Italian courts are under an obligation to give effect to the EU Charter, one wonders 
how keen they would be to do so with respect to an individual working for one of the EU mis-
sions, even if it concerned someone seconded by the Italian authorities. One could forgive them 
for thinking that the first port of call for EU employees ought to be a judicial organ of the EU, if 
only because local courts cannot be expected to invalidate EU decisions, whether operational or 
administrative. 
16 On such normative conflicts generally, see Jan Klabbers and Touko Piipariinen (eds.), Norma-
tive Pluralism and International Law: Exploring Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
17 Methodological alarm-bell: the rendition of the facts of the story owes much to Wikipedia 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_relations – visited 13 July 
2017). That is not ideal, but not detrimental, in that even if the facts turns out to be mistakenly 
rendered, the moral of the story still stands. My aim is not to write the definitive story of EU-
Ukraine relations (in which case I should not rely as much on Wikipedia); my aim, instead, is to 
make on point on good intentions and their effects. 
  
least terms of creating such closer ties. Former members of the enemy camp, 
such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, have all joined the EU, and with 
several others, including Russia itself, some kind of partnership agreement has 
been concluded. Part of this has been captured in the adoption and prioritization 
of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, following the earlier adoption of Agenda 
2000.18 
One of the states that the EU is keen on establishing closer ties with is Ukraine, 
for a variety of reasons, some perhaps bordering on cynicism. There are the 
usual geopolitical reasons, with Ukraine bordering several EU member states. 
There are the usual strategic reasons, with Ukraine offering one route for the 
transportation of Russian natural gas to European cities. And there might be the 
added benefit of pestering Russia a little: since Russia tends to view Ukraine as 
part of its sphere of influence, capturing Ukraine would represent quite a coup.19 
For a decade, a partnership agreement was in place, and Ukraine repeatedly ex-
pressed a desire to move towards an association with the EU, widely viewed (alt-
hough not by the EU itself) as a prelude for eventual full membership. 
After the partnership agreement had expired a new association agreement had 
been prepared (though without guarantees about future membership), but the 
EU started to dither and cited human rights concerns as a reason not to go full 
speed ahead.  This was inspired by the imprisonment in Ukraine of former Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and other political leaders, with their imprisonment 
signaling a dwindling respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.  
That was no doubt a fair assessment, and it raised the classic problem of the 
dirty hands in one of its many manifestations.20 Should a political actor engage in 
doing something of a dubious ethical nature if doing so serves, in his or her opin-
ion, the common good? In this case, starkly put: should the conclusion of an asso-
ciation agreement, meant to be of mutual interest and benefit, be suspended over 
the plight of a few individuals?  
                                               
18 For early analysis, see Marise Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More Than a 
Partnership?’, in Marise Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 244-299. See also …, elsewhere in this volume. 
19 Note that Russia was invited to join the European Neighbourhood Policy, but declined. 
20 The seminal study is by Michael Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, (1973) 
2 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 160-180; see also Stuart Hampshire (ed.), Public and Private Mo-
rality (Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
  
Of course, facts are never quite what they seem. The ‘few individuals’ at issue 
here include political leaders, whose symbolic value is huge. Put differently and 
without being cynical, it is not at all self-evident that the EU would have adopted 
a similar course of action if the political prisoners had been ordinary people, a 
few factory workers perhaps, or a handful of bus drivers. It was, arguably, not 
the imprisonment as such, but the identity of those imprisoned, which spurred 
the EU to using the Association Agreement as the carrot to dangle in front of 
Ukraine’s nose. 
It may also be of relevance whence this upsurge in ethical thinking came. Again, 
without being cynical, Europe’s leaders are perfectly capable of ignoring or mas-
saging requests stemming from fringe groups, or even from the relevant non-
governmental organizations (think of Amnesty International, e.g.). In this case, 
however, the pressure was reportedly exerted by the European People’s Party, 
the network of center-right political parties that governs many of the EU mem-
ber states and also occupies a prominent position in the Commission. And that is 
a source of discontent that is difficult to ignore. 
And then there are the expected benefits of the agreement itself. An important 
strand of political philosophy suggests that an improving economic situation, es-
pecially in conjunction with free trade and liberal markets, will generally also im-
prove the chances for human rights. In other words, it is often posited that free 
trade is not just good for the economy (assuming it is and ignoring distributive 
questions), but has a radiating effect on other matters. In such a constellation, 
one might have expected strong support for the Association Agreement precisely 
with a view to stimulating human rights. 
So, essentially, the politics configured to place ethics at the center of the debate 
or, if you will, pit ethics against law: Ukraine will become an association partner, 
based on a legally binding treaty commitment, if and when it shows respect for 
European values related to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is im-
portant to see that the ethical argument could work in two directions though: 
halting the conclusion could be ethically motivated (‘How can one do business, 
even associate oneself, with a state that imprisons political opposition?’), but so 
could continuing with the agreement (‘Should a general expected human rights 
  
improvement be held hostage for a handful of individuals, no matter how promi-
nent?’). The first line of reasoning follows Kantian thought, according to which 
one should not depart from one’s duties (in this case, to insist on respect for the 
rights of Tymoshenko and others), regardless of the consequences. The second 
approach, usually associated with Bentham and others, is rather consequentialist 
in nature, suggesting that a small sacrifice here may well lead to overall benefi-
cial results.21 
What further complicated matters, though, and was insufficiently recognized by 
either of the two ethical groups, was that Ukraine borders Russia, contains a 
large Russian-speaking population, and includes territory that to Russia was of 
considerable value in the form of Crimea, with its port of Sevastopol. And, as is 
well-known by now, the moment the EU started to dither it created a political 
vacuum in Ukraine, and Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin was keen enough to seize 
the moment, catching many observers by surprise. Hence, the net result of the 
EU’s dithering, so it may be claimed, is the annexation of Crimea by Russia – the 
road to hell, as they say, tends to be paved with good intentions.22 
For deontologists, Kantian or otherwise, such poses no specific methodological 
problems: one simply needs to do one’s duty and follow such rules are applicable 
– although it may become difficult to figure out which rules are applicable, which 
duties are in existence, and how to prioritize among them if several different and 
possibly conflicting rules are applicable. The consequentialist, however, is faced 
with additional methodological problems, for how can one determine which fac-
tors go into the equation to find out what the greatest benefit for the greatest 
number is? In other words, for a consequentialist analysis to be persuasive, the 
analyst must ensure that all relevant factors are included, and this is a difficult, 
perhaps impossible, task. The Ukraine agreement does not merely involve the 
human rights of some prominent individuals and the assumed economic benefits 
                                               
21 The leading consequentialist these days is probably Peter Singer who, rare among ethicists, has 
also applied his thoughts to international affairs. See Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Glob-
alization, 2nd edn (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2004). 
22 For analysis of the legality of Russia’s action, see Thomas D. Grant, ‘Annexation of Crimea’, 
(2015) 109 American Journal of International Law, 68-95. 
  
of the agreement accruing to Ukrainians and the EU’s citizens – it need also fac-
tor in geopolitical considerations, the likelihood of Russia stepping in, the poten-
tial costs of a split Ukraine, et cetera. On such a reasoning, it may be plausible to 
claim that there is little scope for consequentialism in international affairs, since 
the calculus is simply too complicated, making it impossible to determine with 
any degree of accuracy what the greatest good for the greatest number will be.23 
 
4. Pluralism (of Various Kinds) 
 
Both episodes have in common that they pit different normative systems against 
each other. In the case of Ms H., it concerns a conflict concerning the appropriate 
forum against the background of a possible conflict between two legal orders 
(the EU legal order versus Italy’s legal order), while in the case of Ukraine, the 
discussion is better seen as two contending ethical conflicts or, perhaps, one of 
law versus ethics. Either way, both prompt questions as to how to act in such cir-
cumstances, and as such, both are inescapably in tune with the modern condi-
tion. After all, decision-making rarely, if ever, takes place in a normative vacuum 
where the decision-maker can simply apply whatever his (usually ‘his’) ivory 
tower teachings tell him to do – the ivory tower does not exist or, more accu-
rately perhaps, is a rather useless place to dwell in. 
All political decision-making, save perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, is situ-
ational, or contextual. Decision-makers rarely have the luxury to sit back and 
think things through; instead, usually, they have to act under time-pressure; they 
have to act without having all possible relevant information at their fingertips; 
and except in the crudest of dictatorships, they usually also have to take different 
                                               
23 Philosophers insist that calculability is an import aspect of consequentialism, hence, if calcula-
tions are impossible, consequentialism can have little traction – or else quickly slides into rough 
guidelines (‘Beware Russia’), without much actual analysis. The point on calculability is empha-
sized by, e.g., Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Canto, 1993 
[1972]). 
  
constituencies into account.24 As Jackson forcefully puts it: ‘Human conduct is sit-
uational by definition.’25 Things would be helped if there were only a single rule 
or guideline applicable to the facts before them, but alas, this is a rare luxury too. 
Typically, decision-makers are confronted with the situation that somewhere in 
their normative universe, there exists a rule that tells them to do X; while else-
where in that same universe, a different rule may tell them to do Y, or perhaps 
even prohibit them from doing X. In addition, it is not always clear what exact sit-
uation they find themselves in: even if there were a single rule applicable, they 
would first need to determine that their situation calls for this one rule to be ap-
plied – and that determination is itself an act of political judgment which is not, 
and cannot be, guided by the rule itself.26 
When it comes to conflicts between rules stemming from two different legal sys-
tems, the notion of inter-legality may prove a useful explanatory framework – 
without being able to resolve the decision-makers’ dilemma: its value is heuristic 
rather than normative. The source of the idea is, in all likelihood, a lecture by re-
nowned legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, held in 1987, where he 
launched the notion of inter-legality in distinction to the more familiar legal plu-
ralism that was already widely accepted by legal anthropologists.27 Legal plural-
ism, as usually defined, sees to the co-existence in one and the same legal space 
of two distinct legal orders based in two distinct but overlapping political com-
munities, e.g. state law and tribal customary law. By contrast, so Santos sug-
gested, inter-legality sees to competition (or cooperation) between legal norms 
emanating from different legal spaces but (at least prima facie) applicable to the 
same set of circumstances.  
                                               
24 See, e.g., Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role 
and Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Poli-
tics (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
25 See Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000), at 143. 
26 Kratochwil, Status of Law. 
27 The lecture was entitled ’Law: A Map of Misreading’, and is reproduced in Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, 2nd edn. (London: Butterworths, 2002), 417-438, 
with the brief remarks on inter-legality appearing at 437-438. Comparativist Twining once or 
twice referred to inter-legality, but did not develop it much further. See, e.g., William Twining, 
Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000), at 230; and William Twining, ‘Dif-
fusion and Globalization Discourse’, (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal, 507-515. More 
detail is offered by Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Frag-
mentierung des globalen Rechts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 34-41. 
  
A prime example – though not foreseen by Santos – is the rather well-known 
plight of Mr Kadi, confronted, on the one hand with frozen accounts on behalf of 
United Nations law, but claiming, on the other hand, human rights protection 
based on other legal instruments and the TEU. As is well-known, the ECJ eventu-
ally opted for application of the latter, but doing so was dictated by choice rather 
than necessity: it could just as plausibly (or even more plausibly) have argued 
that since UN law prevails over other law, therefore UN law would have to be ap-
plied, even to the detriment of the EU’s constitutional order. The hallmark of in-
ter-legality then, as Santos (very briefly) developed it, is that with conflicts of 
this kind, where many possible decisions may be plausible within their own four 
corners but none forcefully presents itself, the ultimate decision rests on the 
choice of the decision-maker – it can no longer be seen (if it ever could) as the in-
evitable result of the application of a legal rule. And this circumstance entails 
that the precise qualities, epistemological and otherwise, of those decision-mak-
ers are of relevance.28 
Much the same applies to the situation where various ethical norms are pitted 
against each other, or where law conflicts with other normative orders – think of 
social mores, cultural norms, standards of self-regulation, et cetera.29 Here too, it 
may well be problematic to apply one rule at the expense of another in the ab-
sence of a specific meta-rule: who is to say that in a conflict between an ethical 
standard and a legal rule, the ethical standard shall prevail? Or whether in case 
of a conflict involving social mores (think of so-called honour killings) and crimi-
nal law, the former shall prevail? The point is that there is no automatic ranking 
of normative orders, and that such ranking would, in all likelihood, either be im-
possible or at least occasionally undesirable. 
In some sense, law could make a strong claim to normative supremacy – it has a 
lot going for it. It can be relatively clear, and it can be democratically made, with 
input, in principle, of all affected actors – or at least their representatives.30 Thus, 
                                               
28 See further Jan Klabbers and Gianluigi Palombella (eds.), Inter-legality (Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming). 
29 See generally Klabbers and Piipariinen, Normative Pluralism. 
30 See Jan Klabbers, ‘Law-making and Constitutionalism’, in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir 
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one might argue that law ought to be supreme over other normative orders, but 
there are a few snakes in the grass. 
One is, that while law in democracies can be democratically made, not all states 
are democracies, and that even among democracies several factors may exist 
which would affect the ideal nature of the law. Think, e.g., of capture of the law-
making process by special interest groups, or think of election campaign financ-
ing rules, or the rules relating to the creation of voter districts, all of which can 
and are manipulated so as to dilute what could otherwise be a proper democ-
racy.  And think additionally of the unpleasant situation that some of the world’s 
most problematic political leaders have been elected through ostensibly demo-
cratic process; in recent years, one can think of Putin, Erdogan and Trump. On 
the other hand, the contents of other normative orders cannot be intentionally 
created, or even democratically – there is no intentional constitutive process for 
the creation or amendment of ethical imperatives, e.g., whereas many other 
norms (religious norms come to my mind) are typically decreed from above, in 
more or less authoritarian – or at least authorial -  fashion. It would seem, all in 
all, that there are no a priori reasons to prefer the commandments of one norma-
tive order over those of others, which in effect boils down to saying that it often 
boils down to a matter of choice and preference for the political actor concerned. 
 
5. Practical Wisdom 
 
Indeed, the political actor often has many choices to make, choices where the law 
can only offer limited guidance. This is ironic, of course: one of the functions of 
law is precisely to release us from having to make particular choices by 
routizining standard behavior that is deemed appropriate to the circumstances. 
The speed limit is the most obvious example: following the speed limit on any 
stretch of road prevents us from having to make calculations as to what the ap-
propriate speed would be given the curvature of the road, the normal weather 
conditions, the quality of the asphalt or concrete, et cetera.31 
                                               
31 See generally Schauer, Playing by the Rules. 
  
Yet, in political decision-making, it may not always work this way. As noted ear-
lier, choice comes in at several moments. Choice comes in when there are differ-
ent norms applicable to the same configuration of events, and choice comes in 
when trying to frame what the issue is about. The situation of Ms H can be seen 
as one that is largely internal to the Italian civil service; indeed, this is how the 
General Court perceived of the matter. It can also be described as a matter of the 
EU’s foreign policy – this is, in a nutshell, how the Council saw the matter. And it 
can be seen as a matter of EU administration, mindful of the circumstance that 
even if Ms H was seconded by Italy, and even if she was nominally involved in a 
foreign policy operation, she was nonetheless working to represent the EU and 
in a rule of law mission at that. Likewise, the botched agreement with Ukraine 
can be seen as a commendable exercise of ethics on the part of the EU, but can 
also be seen as a manifestation of conditionality, or simply ineffectual geopoliti-
cal manoeuvering.  
The point is, that in both examples, there is no meta-rule which can decide which 
viewpoint is the correct one. On the plight of Ms H, there is no meta-rule to de-
cide whether the viewpoint of the General Court, the Council, or the ECJ, is cor-
rect: all three are plausible within their own four corners. And on Ukraine, like-
wise, there is no meta-rule to tell us whether to insist on an unblemished human 
rights record for our partners, or whether cooperation should help assist in 
achieving such a record, or even whether it is desirable to mingle in the internal 
affairs of a would-be partner state to the extent the EU did. These are not ques-
tions that can be answered in general manner, as they involve choice and there-
with judgment on the part of the responsible political actor. And such judgment 
cannot be based on the application of a political algorithm (neither ‘When find-
ing trading partners, always insist on unblemished human rights records’ nor 
‘When finding trading partners, ignore their human rights records’), for the con-
text will always be different and, accordingly, judgment may differ from one case 
to the next. 
There is nothing per se wrong with this: Aristotle already recognized 2500 years 
ago that politics is contextual, and there is no particular reason to presume that 
in the intervening millennia politics has ceased to be contextual. The media, of 
course, may look for inconsistencies, as these make for a good story, but even the 
  
most self-righteous reporter will have to acknowledge that trading with Ukraine, 
located as it is next to Russia, carries different risks than does trading with, say, 
Nicaragua. And even the most self-righteous reporter will accept that a mission 
devoted to promoting the rule of law can ill-afford to deprive its own staff mem-
bers from access to justice. 
Importantly though, while Aristotle accepted the contextual nature of political 
action, he did not let this slide into a free-for-all, and neither did he succumb to 
the pessimism of philosophical situationalism (this suggests that all action is sit-
uational, and actors rarely, if ever, display consistent behavior across situa-
tions32). Instead, Aristotle developed a concise set of standards but, rather than 
focusing on the quality (ethical or otherwise) of concrete political acts, his frame-
work revolved around the quality of the political actor. For Aristotle, man was a 
political animal, who could mostly excel in public life, and the goal of whose life 
was to reach a flourishing existence (eudaimonia).33 To this end, the individual 
would be well-advised to develop a number of virtues, as these would enable 
him to flourish. Thus, honesty, courage, and humility were considered virtues – 
among many others, with two additional virtues being of prime importance. On 
the one hand, there was the virtue of justice, bringing the other virtues together. 
On the other hand, and of particular relevance in the present context, there was 
the virtue of practical wisdom: phronesis, as Aristotle referred to it, or prudentia, 
as Aquinas latinized it.34  
Practical wisdom is a philosophically slippery concept, to be distinguished on the 
one hand from science and wisdom, but on the other also from mere technical 
competence as well as intuition.35 Moreover, it has been suggested that to insist 
on phronesis makes that virtuous action will often be limited to an elite of 
phronemoi: try as we might to be humble and courageous, we can only manage to 
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35 Some of the difficulties are discussed in Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009). 
  
be called virtuous if we are also blessed with practical wisdom.36 Others have de-
fused this by suggesting that acting on virtue is like practicing skills, and within 
reach for practically anyone who can be considered a citizen.37 Either way, what 
is clear is that phronesis involves the capacity to deliberate, reason, and take ac-
tion. It is this intellectual virtue that allows us to recognize facts and situations 
and think through their consequences. In terms of the examples used: it is 
phronesis which helps us understand that being tough on Ukraine might create 
an opening for Russia to step in; it is phronesis that helps us to understand that 
the situation of Ms H is not best seen as an Italian administrative affair, or exclu-
sively as a matter of foreign policy. Precisely at the vanishing point of our rules 
and commandments, where these are no longer capable of offering guidance, is 
where the virtues come in – at least, this is one of the points where they come in. 
There are other points as well – think only of making proper use of existing rules, 
rather than engaging in an ‘abus de droit’. But at the very least, the virtues should 
assist us in distinguishing different situations, and reaching for action that is 
based on justice rather than opportunism – and justice is the defining claim 
made by all legal systems.38 
 




The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is embedded in a conglomerate of 
numerous rules. Many of those rules are legal rules: the CFSP is embedded, e.g., 
in international law, both when it comes to prescriptions and proscriptions 
(‘Thou Shalt Not Invade’) and when it comes to the broader legal framework, 
such as represented by notions of jurisdiction or responsibility. It is not for the 
EU to single-handedly depart from international law, nor is it for the EU to insist 
that international law be re-written so as to accommodate its special nature.39 
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Many of the other applicable legal rules are internal to the EU, and aim to pre-
serve an institutional balance that may or may not derive from an arbitrary equi-
librium, valid at the moment of codification but perhaps no longer. Some may 
serve to protect the prerogatives of some of the institutions; others may insulate 
the CFSP from intrusion by some of the institutions – think in particular of the 
provisions excluding the Parliament or the Court of Justice.    
Moreover, the EU is also embedded in an ethical nomos. It is no good to claim 
that, technically, the EU is not bound to respect the norms of international hu-
manitarian law in those conflicts where it intervenes because, well, technically, it 
is not a party to the Geneva Conventions and an argument can be made that ex-
isting customary international law cannot plausibly be applied to entities that 
are not states without taking a few further jurisprudential steps.40 Likewise, the 
EU should not engage in genocide or gross human rights violations, neither by 
act nor by omission.41 In addition, EU troops and police forces will carry with 
them their own ethical traditions and military rules, while administrators too 
will be influenced and steered by their own professional standards: Ms H, being a 
lawyer trained in Italy, will be unable to de-activate her years of training and the 
sense of propriety inculcated during these years, even when seconded to opera-
tions outside Italy. In other words, there is in principle an enormous amount of 
rules and standards vying for recognition within even every single individual, let 
alone within multinational units such as, typically, those involved in actions com-
ing under the CFSP. Too ask whether there is ‘too much law’ here is a bit like ask-
ing whether there is too much time in a 24-hour period. 
On the other hand, in a sense there is too much law. Law has the unpleasant side-
effect, occasionally, of dulling our sense of the virtues, and perhaps even our 
sense of outrage. Put differently, the existence of a legal rule invites the evalua-
tion of action (past of future) in light of that rule. If the speed limit indicates 50 
miles per hour, our driving will be discussed in terms not whether it was too fast 
per se, but whether it was too fast in light of the speed limit. This is not normally 
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a problem, but sometimes may become one: if, e.g., an oil spill has taken place on 
the road ahead of us, 45 miles per hour may all of a sudden be way too fast, even 
if technically it remains within the speed limit. A more dramatic example is how 
the European Court of Human Rights, in 2013, came close to denying the Arme-
nian genocide for the simple (and really excruciating) reason that since the Gen-
ocide Convention had only been concluded in 1948, it seemed dubious whether 
the Armenia genocide could be considered a proper genocide, notwithstanding 
the circumstance that up to one and a half million people were intentionally 
slaughtered for reasons related to their descent. Here, analysis of the event in 
terms of law took over at the expense of a more common sense or emphatic ap-
proach. Then again, maybe the problem is not that there is too much law here, 
but that the lawyers cling to their techne and ignore phronesis and other vir-
tues.42  
 
7. To Conclude 
 
It goes without saying that modern societies cannot do without rules, whether 
we call these law or, as is increasingly common in international affairs, think of 
them as norms, standards, or guidelines, legally binding or otherwise authorita-
tive and meant to influence behaviour. If rules are indeed signposts flagging de-
sirable and commendable behaviour without having to think twice, then no soci-
ety can do without.43 
On the other hand, it is also the case that rules (whether legal or otherwise) can-
not prescribe the conditions for their own application in all possible scenarios, 
and cannot dictate their own interpretation in all possible circumstances; hence, 
while a seven-year old may be able to apply a given rule, applying it wisely takes 
a little more than a dictionary or an algorithm. It takes, as Aristotle put it, a cer-
tain degree of phronesis, of practical wisdom. There may be circumstances where 
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there is too little law; there may be circumstances where there is too much law. 
The two examples explored above suggests that there may be also be circum-
stances where there is too little practice wisdom. But there are unlikely to be cir-
cumstances where there is too much practical wisdom.   
  
